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Abstract
Background and Objectives: With rapid advancements in medicine, technology, and nutrition, the future holds the pos-
sibility of longer and healthier lives. Despite garnering attention from myriad disciplines, psychological perspectives on 
life extension are scarce. In three studies, we addressed this gap by exploring key mental characteristics and psychological 
variables associated with simulating an expanded life span and thus an extremely distant future self.
Research Design and Methods: Three studies investigated the construal (i.e., valence, vividness, and visual perspective) 
of extremely distant future simulations and the extent to which participants felt connected to their future selves (i.e., self-
continuity). Studies 1 and 2 investigated the characteristics of imagery associated with different ages ranging from near 
the current species maximum (e.g., 120, 150) to more highly hypothetical ages (e.g., 201, 501). Study 3 probed the mental 
construal of extreme aging among different populations (i.e., life-extension supporters, students, and Mechanical Turk 
workers). Studies also assessed participants’ general feelings about the ethicality and likelihood of techniques that halt or 
reverse biological aging to help individuals live beyond the current life expectancy.
Results: Participants in all studies reported being able to vividly imagine expanded aging scenarios (increased chronolog-
ical, without biological, and aging), but these simulations were characterized by a decreased sense of connection to one’s 
future self (i.e., self-continuity) compared to a control condition. Temporal distance did not, however, impact ratings of 
self-continuity when comparing experimental conditions (i.e., imagining one’s self 120 vs 150 or 201 vs 501). Curiously, a 
sense of self-continuity (when simulating oneself well beyond the current life expectancy) remained intact for individuals 
who belonged to a community of life-extension supporters. The perceived likelihood and ethicality of extended life-span 
scenarios also varied significantly across different populations.
Discussion and Implications: The current work is the first to quantify the disconnect between one’s current and extremely 
distant (i.e., beyond the current life expectancy) future self. Given the behavioral implications of feeling disconnected from 
one’s future self (e.g., failing to save for retirement or care for one’s own physical health), these findings inform a critical 
barrier of extended life spans and provide insight into potential remedies (e.g., enhancing the perceived likelihood of living 
longer). Theoretical implications of hypotheticality and temporal distance, two key dimensions of Construal Level Theory, 
and their impact on the construal and self-continuity associated with future simulations are also discussed.
Translational Significance: A  potential psychological barrier associated with increased life expectancy is 
feeling disconnected from one’s future self. The current work leveraged mental imagery to assess when and 
for whom this barrier is most prominent. Results inform strategies to create continuity in one’s sense of self 
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In a world of medical and technical advancements, ex-
tended life spans are becoming increasingly more tangible. 
What was once merely gripping science fiction or fodder 
for deep existential musings now seems to have significant 
scientific traction (Longo et al., 2015). Whether through up-
loading one’s consciousness to a machine (Bamford, 2012), 
or undergoing regenerative aging interventions (Romain, 
2010), it is possible that the not-too-distant future holds op-
portunities to dramatically increase the life span (Sandberg 
& Bostrom, 2008). To date, regenerative aging interventions 
are the most widely accepted and realistic approaches to 
achieving extreme longevity, circumventing deeply philo-
sophical questions about the soul and immortality. Indeed, 
a growing number of individuals are already engaged in 
variations of such interventions, from caloric restriction 
to pharmacological supplementation (Longo et al., 2015). 
While certainly a topic for moral and sustainability de-
bates (Schneider, 2009), one cannot help but wonder what 
it might be like to live for hundreds of years—to have 
the opportunity to experience the extremely distant fu-
ture. Philosophers, writers, and computer scientists have 
painted both enticing (Schloendrom, 2006) and distressing 
(Pijnenburg & Leget, 2007) pictures of life extension, but a 
psychological perspective remains largely absent from the 
literature. Aside from the ethical, environmental, and tech-
nical hurdles of life extension, one might imagine that there 
will also be concerns about mental health and well-being if 
individuals should begin living well beyond their currently 
expected number of years. In fact, the question remains 
whether or not individuals would even want to live beyond 
their expected life span and if so, for how long?
Inquiries about the desirability of, and attitudes associ-
ated with, extended life spans are becoming more common 
in the literature (see Ballinger, Tisdale, Sellen, & Martin, 
2017; Bowen et al., 2019; Kogan, Tucker, & Porter, 2011). 
The increase in attention to life extension is representative 
of a global phenomenon. According to the World Health 
Organization, life expectancy increased 5  years between 
2000 and 2015, the largest documented increase since the 
1960s. For the United States and the United Kingdom, 
homes to some of the highest life expectancy rates, 
expectancies have nearly doubled since the 1900s (Pew 
Research Center, 2013a; Public Health England, 2016), 
with the number of centenarians worldwide expected to 
increase approximately eightfold by 2050 (Pew, 2016). 
From a psychological perspective, the response to these 
trends has been twofold: (1) consider the mental and phys-
ical changes associated with aging, and (2) investigate the 
cognitive and emotional components associated with the 
idea of living longer lives.
Paradoxically, at a time when life spans are increasing, 
ideas about aging are often quite negative. In particular, 
individuals report fears associated with loss later in life 
as well as the physical and psychological effects of aging 
(Tahmaseb et  al., 2003). Indeed, research describing late 
adulthood has confirmed considerable physical and cog-
nitive decrements associated with aging (Schaie & Willis, 
2011). Eyesight, muscle strength, reaction times, and the 
ability to recall new information (to name but a few) all de-
cline with age while the susceptibility to diseases increases 
(Cleary, Zaborski, & Ayanian, 2004; Myers & Dewall, 
2015). Importantly, however, the picture of aging is not as 
bleak as it might seem. Contrary to popular belief, self-es-
teem, life satisfaction, and subjective well-being tend to be 
relatively stable across the life span (Lansford, 2018; (Jebb, 
Morrison, Tay, & Diener, 2019)). Late adulthood is also 
often characterized by increased positive affect, emotional 
control, stability, and acceptance (Carstensen et al., 2011; 
Shallcross, Ford, Floerke, & Mauss, 2013; Stone, Schwartz, 
Broderick, & Deaton, 2010; Urry & Gross, 2010). What 
is more, the most dramatic decreases in mental state and 
ability are not seen until the final years of life, a phenomenon 
referred to as terminal decline (Backman & MacDonald, 
2006). Indeed, some researchers suggest that “nearness to 
death” is a better predictor of mental states and abilities 
than age (Shrira, Bodner, & Palgi, 2014). As the picture of 
late adulthood continues to emerge, psychologists are able 
to more clearly describe the process of aging and to more 
fruitfully consider interventions to aid an increasingly eld-
erly population.
An additional (and also growing) body of research 
has focused not on the experience of being older, but 
thinking about being older. Prospection, the ability to tran-
scend the present moment and contemplate future points 
in time, is often argued to be something that is not only 
unique to humans, but also highly adaptive (Moulton & 
Kosslyn, 2009; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Exploring 
prospection can also be incredibly insightful, elucidating 
links between the conceptualization of the future self and 
related behaviors. According to the Construal Level Theory, 
temporal distance is a key dimension of Psychological 
Distance—a factor identified to impact the way that events 
are conceptualized. Investigations of imagining one’s future 
self have revealed that the characteristics associated with 
mental simulation vary as a function of temporal distance. 
In particular, distant experiences tend to be construed as 
more positive, abstract and conceptual whereas proximal 
experiences are often characterized by concrete and de-
tailed mental representations (see Liberman & Trope, 1998; 
Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). Narratives describing 
one’s distant future (e.g., 3 years from now) self also tend to 
be characterized by more positive and predictable content 
than narratives describing one’s near future (e.g., 1 month 
from now) self (Heller, Stephan, Kifer, & Sedikides, 2011; 
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Stephan, Sedikides, Heller, & Shidlovski, 2015). Curiously, 
the impact of age on mental construal tends to run parallel 
to the consequences of temporal distance, such that older 
adults simulate the distant future with less episodic speci-
ficity (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008). In other words, their 
simulations tend to be more abstract and generalized (see 
Löckenhoff & Rutt, 2017). Beyond isolated explorations 
of age and temporal distance, it is important to note that 
the two are not orthogonal factors. When participants are 
asked to imagine a specific age (as will be the case in the 
present studies), temporal distance inherently varies as a 
function of one’s current age. Clearly, temporal distance 
and age shape the manner in which an event is mentally 
constructed and should be considered in tandem.
Aside from a distinct mental construal, imagining the 
distant future is also characterized by myriad behavioral 
discrepancies. Contrasting simulations of the near and distant 
future has revealed significant differences in procrastination 
behaviors (McCrea, Liberman, & Trope, 2008), willingness 
to delay gratification (Chapman, 1996; Chapman & Elstein, 
1995; Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002), 
choices to undergo difficult or unpleasant tasks, and efforts 
to act prosocially (Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008). The 
incongruity tends to be so pronounced that decisions for 
one’s future self are likely to resemble decisions made for an 
entirely different person more than they do decisions made 
for the present self (Pronin et  al., 2008; Pronin & Ross, 
2006; Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 2008). 
Thus, self-continuity, or the sense of overlap between one’s 
current and future self, has become a key variable of in-
terest when exploring the otherwise puzzling differences in 
present versus future decision-making processes (Bartels & 
Rips, 2010; Ersner-Hershfield, Garton, Ballard, Samanez-
Larkin, & Knustson, 2009; Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & 
Knutson, 2009). Curiously, the visual perspective employed 
to imagine an event has a significant impact on one’s sense 
of self-continuity (Tausen, Miles, Lawrie, & Macrae, 2018). 
Not only can a lack of continuity manifest in the adoption 
of a third-person perspective, but manipulating perspective 
can result in feeling disconnected from one’s past or future 
self (see Tausen, Carpenter, & Macrae, 2019 for review). For 
individuals who feel more in tune with their future selves, or 
acknowledge stronger links between current decisions and 
future consequences, there is less difference between choices 
made for the near and distant future (Bartels & Urminsky, 
2011; Hershfield, 2011; Mitchell, Schirmer, Ames, & 
Gilbert, 2011; Parfit, 1971, 1987; Schelling, 1984; Stephan, 
Shidlovoski, & Sedlikides, 2018; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981).
A systematic review article by Löckenhoff and Rutt 
(2017) has extended the investigations of perceived fu-
ture self-continuity to an older population. The review 
highlights an impressive body of indirect evidence for a 
relationship between age and self-continuity ranging from 
differences in the perception of the passage of time to the 
increased stability of personality traits and the coherence 
of personal narratives for older adults (Troll, Skaff, & 
McKean, 1997). Even research from behavioral economics 
provides supporting evidence for increased self-continuity 
with age. Temporal discounting, in particular, is a phenom-
enon in which individuals assign a diminished value to a 
reward simply because it is delayed in time. The behavioral 
manifestation of temporal discounting—foregoing more in 
the future to have less now (e.g., 90 dollars today rather 
than 100 dollars next month)—can be measured to assess 
the extremity with which future rewards are devalued. 
Some explorations have revealed that older adults are 
less likely than younger adults to discount future rewards 
(Li, Baldassi, Johnson, & Weber 2013; Löckenhoff, 
O’Donoghue, & Dunning, 2011; but see Sanchez-Roige 
et  al., 2018). Given recent work that has demonstrated 
self-continuity as a driving factor in temporal discounting 
for young adults (Bartels & Urminsky, 2011; Ersner-
Hershfield, Garton, et  al., 2009), one might hypothesize 
that a similar mechanism is at work in an older population. 
While this has yet to be tested, Löckenhoff and Rutt (2017) 
do identify three studies that have directly explored the 
link between age and future self-continuity. Corroborating 
work focused on past self-continuity (Habermas & Köber, 
2015; Sedikides et  al., 2016), investigations probing the 
future have revealed a positive correlation between age 
and self-continuity (Hershfield, 2011; Rutt & Löckenhoff, 
2016a, b). In particular, Rutt and Löckenhoff (2016b) 
charted the self-continuity associated with contemplations 
of multiple time points (from 3 months to 10 years from 
now) and found that after 1 year, older adults’ ratings of 
self-continuity begin to stabilize, whereas younger adults 
continued to experience a decrease in self-continuity with 
increased temporal distance.
Notwithstanding the critical importance of this work 
for development, decision-making, and self-construal, the 
temporal windows investigated to date have been rela-
tively narrow given rapidly increasing life expectancies. For 
both older and younger adults, most of the reviewed lit-
erature has focused on “distant futures” that are between 
two and 10 years from now. Rising concerns about being 
able to financially support increased life spans have ex-
tended inquiries to include conceptualizations of oneself 
around retirement age. Investigations of imagining oneself 
40 years in the future (Macrae et al., 2017) or seeing one-
self through a virtual reality interface 50 years in the fu-
ture (Hershfield et al., 2011) have revealed that a sense of 
present and future self-overlap (self-continuity) is a key de-
terminant of prudent financial decisions (e.g., saving rather 
than spending). While these techniques may prove to be 
fruitful for improving decisions made for one’s future self 
in several domains, information about the components of 
mental imagery that characterize extraordinarily distant fu-
ture simulations and the effects of age are currently missing 
from the literature (Löckenhoff & Rutt, 2017).
Extrapolating from the data at hand, one might presume 
that increasing temporal distance would be met with pre-
dictable changes in associated variables (e.g., abstraction, 
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valence, and self-continuity). But what happens when the 
rules change and temporal distance is no longer met by the 
expected physical and mental decline currently associated 
with aging? And how might the simulations of older adults, 
who have less temporal distance to mentally traverse, com-
pare to their younger counterparts when imagining an ex-
tremely distant future? It is precisely these issues—living 
longer without getting biologically older and the impact 
of highly relevant demographic variables—that are of in-
terest to the present inquiry. In particular, the current 
work explores the mental construal of hypothetical aging 
scenarios and depicts current perceptions of life-span ex-
tension across different populations.
The Current Research
Three experiments were designed to probe the characteristics 
associated with imagining an extraordinarily distant future 
under the presuppositions of regenerative aging interventions 
(procedures to halt or reverse the aging process). Studies 1 
and 2 explored the characteristics of imagery associated with 
different counterfactual ages ranging from near the current 
species maximum (e.g., 120, 150) to more highly hypothet-
ical ages (e.g., 201, 501). Study 3 probed the mental construal 
of extreme aging among different populations (life-extension 
supporters, students, Mechanical Turk workers) with a sce-
nario that asked participants to imagine an average day in 
their life at 180 years old.
It is worth noting the hypotheticality of the sce-
nario in which participants of the following empirical 
studies were asked to engage—imagining chronological 
without biological aging. One might wonder if it is even 
possible to imagine chronological without biological 
aging. While at its heart this is a deeply philosophical 
question, the psychology literature has demonstrated 
that it is not at all atypical for individuals to simulate 
counterfactual scenarios or situations well beyond cur-
rent reality (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 1997). Thinking about the future, in partic-
ular, is believed to be even less restricted than thinking 
about the past (Van Boven, Kane, & McGraw, 2008). In 
short, prospection is a tool by which humans are able 
to simulate the unrealized, whether impossible or just 
slightly bizarre. Indeed, every time an individual engages 
in prospection (imagining the future), they are in fact 
imagining a hypothetical event.
Of course, mental simulations are heavily influenced 
by expectations about what the future will be like and 
common mental scripts—what we believe to be “typically” 
associated with aging (e.g., in a culture where getting mar-
ried and having children in one’s 20’s is the norm, it is likely 
that young children will imagine their futures to include 
these activities). Simulating a life beyond one’s current life 
expectancy may then uncover insightful differences in un-
derlying assumptions about what the future will be like 
or how one would feel after living for so many years. For 
those who have less experience with the idea of life exten-
sion, or find the notion of living longer less desirable, we 
expect to see the most notable differences when comparing 
simulations of an extremely distant future to simulations of 
the present (a control condition).
The key characteristics of mental imagery probed here 
include the following: valence, vividness, self-continuity, 
and visual perspective. The selection of these variables was 
informed by previous work that has investigated thinking 
about one’s future self within the boundaries of the current 
life expectancy (Hershfield et al., 2011; Macrae et al., 2017; 
Pronin et al., 2008; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Wakslak et al., 
2008). All of these imagery qualities have been assessed 
using single-item, face valid measures adopted from the 
mental imagery literature (see Macrae et al., 2015; Tausen 
et al., 2018, 2019). Each of our three studies also considered 
perceptions of the likelihood and ethicality of life extension 
in order to accurately describe the samples (and their cor-
responding assumptions) under investigation in the current 
research. Study 3, in particular, assessed a unique popula-
tion of individuals—life-extension supporters—who are al-
ready invested in the idea of living beyond the current life 
expectancy. As such, we expected this group of individuals 
to differ significantly from other populations not only in 
terms of how they imagine the distant future, but also their 
overarching beliefs about life extension.
Given the unprecedented and exploratory nature of this 
work, we did not have detailed hypotheses surrounding the 
specific characteristics of mental imagery that would (and 
would not) be impacted by imagining oneself beyond the 
current life expectancy under the guise of chronological 
without biological aging. The assessment of self-continuity 
is, however, the backbone of our investigation due to the 
weighty cognitive and behavioral implications of feeling 
disconnected from one’s future self. While previous re-
search has suggested that distant future simulations are 
often characterized by a weaker sense of self-continuity 
than simulations of the near future, the mechanism under-
lying this effect (e.g., different mental or physical abilities, 
time in general, stereotypes about older adults, etc.) is not 
well understood. Thus, we remained open to the possibility 
that without the physical cues of aging, people could men-
tally transport themselves to an extremely distant future 
and still feel very connected to their future selves.
Study 1: 120 Versus 150 Years Old
Method
Participants/design
Power analyses estimated on a medium effect size (0.25) for 
three groups revealed that a sample size of 60 participants 
per group would result in 86% power. Preregistered sample 
size was set at 80 participants per condition.
Two hundred and forty participants were recruited on-
line using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com). 
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After reading a brief description of the task, Mechanical 
Turk workers who chose to take part were linked to a 
survey, which was generated and administered using 
Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Mechanical Turk’s unique 
“worker id” numbers and IP addresses were recorded for 
each submitted survey, thus allowing multiple responses 
from the same individual to be excluded from data anal-
ysis. No responses came from repeated IP addresses. 
Eleven participants failed at least one of the manipulation 
checks and were dropped from the sample. Data analysis 
was performed on the remaining 229 participants (121 
females, 1 nonbinary) aged between 18 and 77 (M = 36.66, 
Mdn = 33.00, SD = 12.74). The age distribution was non-
normally distributed, with a skewness of 1.01 (SE = 0.16). 
Quartiles include the following age ranges: 18–28, 29–33, 
34–43, and 44–77.
The study was reviewed and approved by Seattle Pacific 
University Institutional Review Board and preregistered 
on aspredicted.org. All participants were informed about 
the nature of the study prior to agreeing to participate and 
were able to withdraw at any point. The study employed a 
single factor (Imagery Condition: 120 years vs 150 years vs 
Control) between-participants design.
Materials/procedure
A short questionnaire was constructed to investigate the 
role of hypothetical aging on characteristics of mental 
imagery. After reading a brief description of the study 
participants were given the following information,
With the advancements of medicine and technology, our 
understanding of what it looks like to grow older is rap-
idly changing. Imagine that it is possible for you to grow 
older without experiencing any physical or mental decline 
by engaging in continuous regenerative interventions 
(procedures to halt or reverse the aging process). In other 
words, imagine it is possible to maintain optimal health, 
and fitness no matter how old you are—to spend more 
years alive without getting biologically older.
As an attention check, participants used a free response 
format to describe regenerative aging interventions in their 
own words. Participants were then randomly assigned to 
an imagery condition. Participants in the life-extension 
conditions were told:
Assume that you have just recently started regenera-
tive interventions that will slow and possibly even re-
verse your aging process. On the next page, you will be 
asked to imagine what it would be like to be 120 (vs 
150) years old and participating in a work-/job-related 
activity of your choice on a Monday morning.
Whereas participants in the control condition read,
Assume that you have just recently learned about regen-
erative aging interventions, but are currently not eligible 
to take part. On the next page, you will be asked to im-
agine being your current age and participating in a work-/ 
job-related activity of your choice on a Monday morning.
Participants in all conditions were then asked to report 
what activity they would be imagining and the year asso-
ciated with the age they were asked to imagine—questions 
that would serve as our final two manipulation checks. On 
the next page, participants were given 30 s to imagine the 
scenario.
Following the task, participants were asked to describe 
their mental imagery (free response format) and respond 
to a number of questions probing the characteristics of 
their mental imagery. Specifically, participants were asked 
to report on the valence (very negative/very positive) and 
vividness of their imagery (not very vivid/very vivid) as 
well as how engaged they imagined being in their work 
(not at all/very much) and self-continuity—the extent to 
which they felt the person they were imagining was actu-
ally them (not at all like me—it felt like I was imagining 
a different person/very much like me—it felt like I  was 
imagining myself) on 100-point analog scales with the 
aforementioned anchors. Similarity between their cur-
rent job/work activities and the ones they imagined was 
also probed using a 4-point Likert scale. Participants also 
used forced choice questions to report the visual perspec-
tive that characterized their imagery (i.e., first person vs 
third person vs both perspectives represented equally). 
After completing the core dependent variable questions, 
participants were asked to report on the likelihood that 
regenerative aging techniques will be available and ef-
fective in the future and whether they find engaging in 
aging regeneration to be morally/ethically acceptable on 
100-point analog scales with appropriate anchors. Finally, 
participants answered demographic questions including 
their age and how religious/spiritual they consider them-
selves, were thanked, and debriefed.
Results
Imagery characteristics
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) revealed an 
effect of Imagery Condition on the sense of self-continuity 
[F(2, 224) = 3.92, p = .021, ηp
2 = .034] and job consistency 
[F(2, 224) = 9.77, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08], which characterized 
mental imagery. No other effects of aging condition 
were found on any of the other dependent variables (va-
lence, vividness, and job engagement) that were collected 
(F’s < 1.02). It is worth noting that the MANOVA approach 
was utilized here because individualized ANOVAs do not 
have the ability to account for shared variance (e.g., they 
ignore that there is likely a relationship between the de-
pendent variables because they are coming from the same 
people—for example, those naturally higher in imagery 
ability may show both higher vividness and self-continuity 








niversity of Aberdeen user on 10 N
ovem
ber 2020
scores, or those who imagine engaging in the same job that 
they are doing now may also report a stronger connection 
to their future self). Follow-up analyses using individual 
ANOVAs demonstrated an identical pattern of results.
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) 
revealed that imagining a work activity at one’s cur-
rent age was characterized by a marginally greater 
sense of self-continuity (M  =  82.07, SD  =  20.39) than 
imagining being 120 years old [M = 74.14, SD = 25.97, 
t(155)  =  2.10, p  =  .076, d  =  .39, 95% confidence in-
terval (CI): 0.48, 15.37] and a significantly greater 
sense of self-continuity than imagining being 150 years 
old [M  =  71.78, SD  =  23.78, t(143)  =  2.80, p  =  .012, 
d = .47, 95% CI: 3.02, 17.56; Figure 1]. Job consistency 
also differed, such that imagining one’s current age was 
characterized by a job more similar to the present one 
[M = 3.35, SD = 0.89) than a job that one imagined having 
at 120 years old [M = 2.79, SD = 1.12, t(153.18) = 3.49, 
p = .002, d = .55, 95% CI: 0.24, 0.88] and 150 years old 
[M = 2.62, SD = 1.07, t(135.64) = 4.41, p < .001, d = .75, 
95% CI: 0.40, 1.05]. No significant differences in self-
continuity or job consistency between the 120-year-old 
and 150-year-old conditions were found (t’s < .94). A χ 2 
test revealed that the use of first person, third person, 
and a combination of the two perspective was not sig-
nificantly differentially distributed across conditions, 
χ 2 (4, N = 229) = 7.99, p =  .092, such that 58.90% of 
current age simulations were characterized by an exclu-
sively first-person perspective, compared to 54.76% of 
120-year-old simulations and 50.0% of 150-year-old 
simulations.
Age as a covariate
Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), controlling for age, 
was conducted for each of the imagery characteristics 
(vividness, valence, self-continuity, and job consistency). 
These analyses revealed an identical pattern of results as 
the MANOVA reported above, with significant effects of 
Imagery Condition on self-continuity and job overlap, but 
no other significant effects. These analyses also revealed 
a significant effect of age on valence, F(1, 222)  =  5.56, 
p =  .019, ηp
2 =  .24, and self-continuity, F(1, 222) = 6.97, 
p = .009, ηp
2 = .03, such that as participants’ age increased, 
they reported more positive simulations and a greater sense 
of self-continuity. No other significant effects of the age 
were found.
Likelihood and ethicality
One-sample t-tests compared participants’ ratings of the 
likelihood that life-extension techniques will be common 
and effective and the ethicality of engaging with relevant 
interventions to the midpoint of the scale. Results revealed 
that participants’ ratings of the likelihood of life-extension 
techniques (M = 52.47, SD = 28.33) did not significantly 
differ from the midpoint of the scale [t(228) = 1.32, p = .19, 
95% CI: −1.22, 6.16], but participants’ ratings of how eth-
ical these interventions are (M = 61.59, SD = 29.69) did sig-
nificantly differ from the midpoint [t(228) = 5.91, p < .001, 
95% CI: 7.72, 15.45], such that participants’ responses 
trended toward an ethical assessment of these interventions 
(Table 1).
Exploratory correlations
Vividness positively correlated with all measures ex-
cept age and religiosity, such that increased vividness 
was associated with increased valence [r(229)  =  .48, 
p < .001], self-continuity [r(229) = .51, p < .001], job 
consistency (r(227) = .16, p = .017), work engagement 
[r(229) =  .41, p < .000], likelihood [r(229) =  .26, p < 
.001], and ethicality [r(229) =  .17, p =  .011]. Valence 
positively correlated with self-continuity [r(229) = .46, 
p < .001], work engagement [r(229) =  .66, p < .001], 
likelihood [r(229) =  .18, p =  .006], age [r(228) =  .15, 
p = .022], and religiosity [r(229) = .13, p = .043]. Self-
continuity positively correlated with job consistency 
[r(227) = .19, p = .004], job engagement [r(229) = .47, 
p < .001], likelihood [r(229)  =  .29, p < .001], ethi-
cality [r(229) =  .29, p < .001], and age [r(228) =  .16, 
p  =  .015]. Job consistency positively correlated with 
ethicality [r(227)  =  .16, p  =  .016]. Job engagement 
positively correlated with likelihood [r(229)  =  .27, 
p < .001], ethicality [r(229)  =  .18, p  =  .006], and re-
ligiosity [r(229) =  .15, p =  .02]. Likelihood positively 
correlated with ethicality [r(229)  =  .50, p < .001]. 
Ethicality positively correlated with age [r(228) = .17, 
p = .011; Table 2].
Discussion
Study 1 explored the mental characteristics associated 
with imagining a hypothetical aging scenario. Mental 
simulations of the present and extremely distant future did 
Figure 1. Judgments of self-continuity associated with imagining a typ-
ical workday in the present compared to 120, 150 (Study 1) 201, and 
501 years old (Study 2). Errors bars represent ± 1 SEM. All measures 
were assessed using a 100-point analog scale.








niversity of Aberdeen user on 10 N
ovem
ber 2020
not differ in standard imagery components (i.e., valence, 
vividness, and visual perspective), but were distinct in the 
extent to which individuals felt a sense of self-continuity 
and the overlap between their current and imagined job. 
Furthermore, 30  years of temporal distance between the 
two hypothetical aging conditions did not significantly 
impact characteristics of the mental simulation such as 
self-continuity, vividness, and valence. What this suggests 
is that temporal distance may only impact perceived self-
continuity if biological aging is involved. If this is the case, 
then differences between the control and the chronolog-
ical without biological aging conditions might be better 
attributed to differences in hypotheticality rather than tem-
poral distance.
Examining age as a covariate revealed an identical 
pattern of results, but also identified age as a signifi-
cant predictor of self-continuity, such that across all 
conditions age was positively correlated with a sense 
of connectedness to one’s future self. Exploratory 
correlations corroborated this finding and also revealed 
a significant correlation between age and the valence of 
the mental simulation, such that the older participants 
were the more positively they rated their mental imagery. 
Extending the current investigation, Study 2 sought to 
push the boundaries of life extension even further by 
investigating simulations of being 201 and 501  years 
old—significantly more hypothetical time points that are 
well beyond the maximum life expectancy for humans 
and spaced 300 (vs 30) years apart.
Study 2: 201 Versus 501 Years Old
Participants/Design
Power analyses estimated on a medium effect size (.25) for 
three groups revealed that a sample size of 60 participants 
per group would result in 86% power. Preregistered sample 
size was set at 80 participants per condition.
Two hundred and eighty-four participants were 
recruited online using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (www.
mturk.com). After reading a brief description of the task, 
Mechanical Turk workers who chose to take part were 
linked to a survey, which was generated and administered 
using Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Mechanical Turk’s 
unique “worker id” numbers and IP addresses were re-
corded for each submitted survey, thus allowing multiple 
responses from the same individual to be excluded from data 
analysis. No responses came from repeated IP addresses. 
Thirteen participants failed at least one of the manipulation 
checks and were dropped from the sample. Data analysis 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Depicting Average Ratings Pertaining to the Perceived Likelihood and Ethicality of Life-Extension 





M (SD) t-value 95% CIdiff M (SD) t-value 95% CIdiff
Study 1 (N = 228) 52.47 (28.33) 1.32 −1.22, 6.16 61.59 (29.69) 5.91** 7.72, 15.45
Study 2 (N = 271) 50.08 (29.74) 0.045 −3.48, 3.64 62.33 (27.58) 7.36** 9.03, 15.63
Study 3: Students (N = 86) 40.49 (27.04) −3.26* −15.31, −3.71 40.09 (26.07) −3.52** −15.50, −4.32
Study 3: Mechanical Turk 
Workers (N = 78)
44.53 (28.57) −1.69 −11.92, 0.97 57.36 (30.17) 2.15* 0.56, 14.16
Study 3: Life-Extension 
Supporters (N = 38)
89.84 (15.51) 15.84** 34.75, 44.94 99.03 (2.81) 107.4** 48.10, 49.95
Note: Values denoted with an asterisk were significantly different from the midpoint of the scale: * p < .05; ** p < .001. CI = confidence interval.
Table 2. Exploratory Correlations Between All Continuous Measures Collected in Study 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Vividness —         
2. Valence .48** —        
3. Self-continuity .51** .46** —       
4. Job consistency .16* .02 .19** —      
5. Job engagement .41** .66** .47** .05 —     
6. Likelihood .26** .18** .29** .13 .27** —    
7. Ethicality .17* .12 .29** .16* .18** .50** —   
8. Age .11 .15* .16* −.03 .12 .02 .17* —  
9. Religiosity .08 .13* .07 −.01 .15* .03 −.1 .12 —
Note: Values denoted with an asterisk were significantly correlated: * p < .05; ** p < .001.
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was performed on the remaining 271 participants (137 fe-
male) aged between 20 and 67 (M = 35.55, Mdn = 33.00, 
SD = 11.14). One participant reported their age as 5, but 
passed all manipulation checks. Thus, the participant’s age 
is not included in the measures of central tendency reported 
here, but their data are included in the remaining data 
analyses. The age distribution was nonnormally distrib-
uted, with a skewness of .96 (SE = 0.15). Quartiles include 
the following age ranges: 20–27, 28–33, 34–41, and 42–67.
The study was reviewed and approved by the Seattle 
Pacific University Institutional Review Board and 
preregistered on aspredicted.org. All participants were 
informed about the nature of the study prior to agreeing 
to participate and were able to withdraw at any point. 
The study employed a single factor (Imagery Condition: 
201  years old vs 501  years old vs Control) between-
participants design.
Materials/Procedure
Procedures were identical to that of Study 1, with the excep-
tion that in the two experimental conditions participants 
were asked to imagine being either 201 or 501 years old 
while performing a work activity. All other measurements 
and procedures remained the same.
Results
Imagery characteristics
MANOVA revealed an effect of Imagery Condition on 
the sense of self-continuity [F(2, 268) = 10.04, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .07], and job consistency [F(2, 268) = 17.27, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .114], which characterized mental imagery. No other 
effects of aging were found (F’s < 1.2). As in Study 1, the 
MANOVA approach was utilized to account for shared 
variance in the dependent variables. Follow-up analyses 
using individual ANOVAs demonstrated an identical pat-
tern of results.
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) 
revealed that imagining a work activity at one’s current 
age was characterized by a greater sense of self-continuity 
(M = 82.11, SD = 17.91) than imagining being 201 years 
old [M = 67.17, SD = 26.89, t(147.12) = 4.32, p < .001, 
d = .66, 95% CI: 8.10, 21.78] and 501 years old [M = 70.14, 
SD = 25.06, t(170.40) = 3.75, p < .001, d = .55, 95% CI: 
5.68, 18.27; Figure 1]. Job consistency also differed, such 
that imagining one’s current age was characterized by a job 
more similar to the present one (M = 3.36, SD = 0.99) than 
a job that one imagined having at 201 years old [M = 2.48, 
SD = 1.12, t(168.81) = 5.50, p < .001, d =  .84, 95% CI: 
0.56, 1.19] and 501  years old [M  =  2.58, SD  =  1.16, 
t(180.83) = 4.90, p < .001, d = .73, 95% CI: 0.46, 1.09]. 
No significant differences in self-continuity or job consist-
ency between the 201-year-old and 501-year-old conditions 
were found. A χ 2 test revealed that the use of first person, 
third person, and a combination of the two perspective 
was differentially distributed across conditions, χ 2 (4, 
N = 271) = 9.79, p = .044, such that 60% of current age 
simulations were characterized by an exclusively first-
person perspective, compared to 39.5% of 201-year-old 
simulations and 47.4% of 501-year-old simulations.
Age as a covariate
ANCOVA controlling for age were conducted for each 
of the imagery characteristics (vividness, valence, self-
continuity, and job consistency). These analyses revealed 
an identical pattern of results as the MANOVA reported 
above, with significant effects of condition on self-
continuity and job overlap, but no other significant effects. 
Analyses also revealed a significant effect of the age, on 
vividness [F(1,267)  =  7.94, p  =  .005, ηp
2  =  .03], valence 
[F(1,267) = 5.04, p = .026, ηp
2 = .02], and self-continuity 
[F(1,267) = 12.40, p = .001, ηp
2 =. 04]. No other significant 
effects of age were found.
Likelihood and ethicality
One-sample t-tests compared participants’ ratings of the 
likelihood that life-extension techniques will be common 
and effective and the ethicality of engaging with relevant 
interventions to the midpoint of the scale. Results revealed 
that participants’ ratings of the likelihood of life-extension 
techniques (M  =  50.08, SD  =  29.74) did not significantly 
differ from the midpoint of the scale [t(270) = .045, p = .96, 
95% CI: −3.48, 3.64], but participants’ ratings of how eth-
ical these interventions are (M  =  62.33, SD  =  27.58) did 
significantly differ from the midpoint [t(270)  =  7.36, p < 
.001, 95% CI: 9.03, 15.63], such that participants responses 
trended toward an ethical assessment of these interventions 
(Table 1).
Exploratory correlations
Vividness positively correlated with all other measures ex-
cept job consistency and ethicality, such that increased viv-
idness was associated with increased valence [r(271) = .35, 
p < .001], self-continuity [r(271) = .50, p < .001], likelihood 
[r(271) = .17, p = .005), work engagement [r(271) = .44, p < 
.000], religiosity [r(271) = .12, p = .041], and age [r(271) = .17, 
p = .004]. Valence positively correlated with self-continuity 
[r(271)  =  .42, p < .001], work engagement [r(271)  =  .63, 
p < .001], job consistency [r(271) = .18, p = .003], ethicality 
[r(271) =  .21, p =  .001], and age [r(271) =  .13, p =  .031]. 
Self-continuity positively correlated with work engagement 
[r(271) = .35, p < .001], likelihood [r(271) = .26, p < .001], 
ethicality [r(271) = .16, p = .009], and age [r(271) = .22, p < 
.001]. Job consistency positively correlated with engagement 
[r(271) = .16, p = .01]. Job engagement positively correlated 
with likelihood [r(271)  =  .14, p  =  .024] and ethicality 
[r(271)  =  .16, p  =  .011]. Likelihood positively correlated 
with ethicality [r(271) = .42, p < .001]. Ethicality negatively 
correlated with religiosity [r(271) = −.19, p = .002]. Age and 
religiosity showed a marginally significant positive correla-
tion [r(271) = .11, p = .068; Table 3].












Study 2 replicated and extended the findings from Study 
1 by exploring more extreme (and thus more hypothet-
ical) temporal distances. Both years from the present and 
years between hypothetical future ages were exaggerated 
such that participants in experimental conditions simu-
lated being 201 or 501 years of age. Corroborating Study 
1, the results revealed a reduced sense of self-continuity 
and job consistency in the hypothetical aging (vs control) 
conditions. The use of first- versus third-person visual per-
spective (or a combination of the two), however, was dif-
ferentially distributed across the three conditions, such that 
present simulations were more likely than distant future 
simulations to be imagined from a first-person perspective. 
These findings departed from those in Study 1, where shifts 
in visual perspective failed to reach significance. The pattern 
of results in the two studies, however, is consistent as Study 
1 demonstrated fewer reports of exclusively first-person 
simulations with increased imaginary age. Controlling for 
age in the analyses revealed an identical pattern of results 
and substantiated the claim that age was a significant pre-
dictor of self-continuity (even when imagining 201+ years 
into the future). Age also significantly correlated with va-
lence such that older participants reported more positive 
imagery, as was the case in Study 1.
Replicating and extending the results from Study 1, 
Study 2 demonstrated that exaggerated temporal dis-
tance (300 years) does not appear to affect the construal 
(e.g., vividness, valence, or self-continuity) of mental 
simulations characterized by hypothetical aging. Whether 
participants imagined themselves being 201 or 501 years 
old did not significantly impact the characteristics of their 
mental simulations, further supporting the notion that the 
attenuation of a sense of connectedness to one’s future self 
may be tied to the mental or physical decline associated 
with aging.
The final study explored perceptions of hypothet-
ical aging among different populations (i.e., students, 
Mechanical Turk workers, and life-extension supporters) 
and probed the characteristics of mentally simulating life 
beyond the life span for members in each of these groups. 
The three groups tested here were chosen in order to rep-
resent individuals with varying levels of knowledge about 
life-extension techniques. In addition, these three groups 
vary in age and religiosity and are thus able to provide a 
more holistic view on perceptions of life extension.




Two-hundred and twenty participants were recruited 
from one of three platforms: Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(N  =  85), Seattle Pacific University’s participant pool 
(N  =  94), and a community of life-extension supporters 
(N = 41). After reading a brief description of the task, those 
who chose to take part were linked to a survey, which 
was generated and administered using Qualtrics (www.
qualtrics.com). Eighteen participants failed at least one 
of the manipulation checks and were dropped from the 
sample. Data analysis was performed on the remaining 202 
participants (116 female, 1 nonbinary) aged between 18 
and 78 (M  =  32.17, Mdn =  27.5, SD  =  14.88). The age 
distribution was nonnormally distributed, with a skewness 
of 1.11 (SE  =  0.16). Quartiles include the following age 
ranges: 18–19, 20–27, 28–39, and 40–78.
The study was reviewed and approved by Seattle Pacific 
University Institutional Review Board. All participants were 
informed about the nature of the study prior to agreeing to 
participate and were able to withdraw at any point. The 
study employed a single factor (Group: Mechanical Turk 
workers, students, life-extension supporters) between-
participants design. Life-extension supporters were 
recruited through their registration and attendance at the 
Undoing Aging conference held in Berlin, Germany, on 
March 15–17, 2018. At the end of an unrelated presenta-
tion by the second author, participants were invited to take 
part in a “short questionnaire about robust life extension.” 
No incentives were offered for participation.
Table 3. Exploratory Correlations Between All Continuous Measures from Study 2
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Vividness —         
2. Valence .35** —        
3. Self-continuity .50** .42** —       
4. Job consistency .05 −.18** .09 —      
5. Job engagement .44** .63** .35** −.15* —     
6. Likelihood .17** .11 .26** .04 .14* —    
7. Ethicality .02 .21** .16** −.06 .15* .42** —   
8. Age .18** .13* .22** .06 .1 −.04 .09 —  
9. Religiosity .13* −.06 .06 .05 −.01 −.04 −.19** .1 —
Note: Values denoted with an asterisk were significantly correlated: * p < .05; ** p < .001.












All procedures and materials were identical to the pre-
vious studies with the exception that participants were 
asked to imagine “an average day in your life when you are 
180 years old.” Participants were not asked about job con-
sistency (because they did not necessarily imagine a work 
scenario). An additional question was added to the survey, 
which asked participants to communicate (via a free re-
sponse format) how long they would like to live if it was 
possible for them to live longer without experiencing the 
physical decline of aging.
Results
Imagery characteristics
MANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Group on 
the valence [F(2, 199) = 9.76, p < .001, η p
2 = .09] and self-
continuity [F(2, 199) = 14.07, p < .001, η p
2 =  .12] and a 
marginally significant effect of condition on the vividness 
of mental imagery [F(2, 199) = 2.85, p = .06, η p
2 = .028]. 
As in Studies 1 and 2, the MANOVA approach was 
utilized to account for shared variance in the dependent 
variables. Follow-up analyses using individual ANOVAs 
demonstrated an identical pattern of results.
Post-hoc (Bonferroni corrected) pairwise comparisons 
revealed no significant differences between any of the 
three groups in vividness. Life-extension supporters re-
ported significantly more positive imagery than both 
Mechanical Turk workers (p = .001, 95% CI: 8.03, 36.46) 
and the student sample (p < .001, 95% CI: 8.35, 36.42). 
Mechanical Turk workers did not significantly differ from 
students (95% CI: −10.81, 11.10) on valence ratings. Life-
extension supporters reported that their simulations were 
characterized by significantly more self-continuity than did 
Mechanical Turk workers (p = .034, 95% CI: 0.80, 28.24) 
and students (p < .001, 95% CI: 12.96, 40.06). MTurk 
workers also significantly differed from the student sample, 
reporting higher levels of self-continuity (p = .02, 95% CI: 
1.41, 22.56; Figure 2).
Chi-square analysis revealed that the distribution of 
visual perspectives was different across groups [χ 2(4, 
N = 202) = 11.20, p = .02]. Students reported the majority 
(39.5%) of their mental simulations to be from a third-
person perspective, whereas 26.7% of simulations were 
characterized by both first- and third-person perspective and 
33.7% of simulations were characterized by first-person im-
agery. The patterns of first- and third-person imagery were 
reversed for the other two groups. Mechanical Turk Workers 
reported the majority of their mental simulations to be 
characterized by first-person imagery (46.15%), whereas 
29.49% were characterized by both first- and third-person 
imagery, and the remaining 24.36% were characterized by 
third-person imagery. Life-extension supporters reported 
the majority of their mental simulations to be characterized 
by first-person imagery (57.90%), whereas 29.00% were 
characterized by both first- and third-person imagery, and 
the remaining 13.16% were characterized by third-person 
imagery.
Age as a covariate
Although the three samples significantly differed in age, 
with students being the youngest (M = 20.17, SD = 14.88), 
followed by Mechanical Turk workers (M  =  37.86, 
SD = 11.01) and the life-extension supporters (M = 48.00, 
SD = 16.14), controlling for age in our analyses resulted 
in an identical pattern of results for all mental imagery 
characteristics, suggesting that the variance in dependent 
variables cannot be explained by age differences between 
the three groups. Analyses revealed no significant effect of 
age on any of the imagery variables.
Likelihood, ethicality, and desired length of extended life
MANOVA revealed a significant effect of Group on the 
perceived likelihood [F(2, 195) = 48.11, p < .010, η p
2 = .33] 
and ethicality [F(2, 195) = 66.24, p < .001, η p
2 =  .41] of 
life-extension techniques. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
(Bonferroni corrected) revealed that the life-extension 
supporters reported life extension to be significantly more 
likely (M = 89.84, SD = 3.62) than students (M = 40.49, 
SD  =  2.92, p < .001, 95% CI: 36.72, 62.06) and the 
Mechanical Turk workers (M = 44.53, SD = 3.23, p < .001, 
95% CI: 32.64, 58.31). The student and Mechanical Turk 
group did not significantly differ on the likelihood measure 
(p = 1, 95% CI: −5.98, 13.81). Life-extension supporters 
also rated life extension to be significantly more ethical 
(M = 99.03, SD = .46) than students (M = 40.09, SD = 2.81, 
p < .001, 95% CI: 46.73, 71.54) and Mechanical Turk 
workers (M = 57.36, SD = 3.42, p < .001, 95% CI: 29.02, 
54.15) on ratings of ethicality. Students and Mechanical 
Turk workers also differed on ratings of ethicality (p < 
.001, 95% CI: 7.86, 27.23;Table 1).
Figure 2. Judgments of valence, vividness, and self-continuity associ-
ated with imagining being 180 years old across each of the three distinct 
groups (students, Mechanical Turk workers, life-extension supporters). 
Errors bars represent ± 1 SEM. All measures were assessed using a 
100-point analog scale.
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Finally, participants were asked how long they would like 
to live if they could do so without getting biologically older. 
Of the 78 Mechanical Turk participants who answered this 
question, 3.8% said they did not know, 3.8% said they 
would like to live indefinitely/forever, and 2.6% qualified 
that their preference would depend on social factors (e.g., 
the relationships they had), 89.7% provided a numerical 
response (M = 16,727.81, Mdn = 137.5, SD = 11,986.65). 
Of the 86 students, 2.3% left the question blank, 3.5% 
suggested they would like to live forever, 3.5% clarified they 
would never take part in relevant interventions, 8.1% said 
they would like to live until they achieved a particular pur-
pose or meaning in life, 4.7% qualified that their preference 
would depend on social factors (e.g., the relationships they 
had/ people they loved were alive), and 77.9% provided a 
numerical value (M = 124.06, Mdn = 100, SD = 65.61). Of 
the 38 life-extension supporters who answered the ques-
tion, 2.6% responded they did not know, 57.9% said they 
would like to life indefinitely/forever, 10.5% qualified that 
they would like to live as long as physically able or until they 
died via a means not related to aging, 2.6% suggested they 
would like to live as long as they experienced purpose, and 
13.2% responded with a numerical value (M = 1,044.00, 
Mdn = 200, SD = 1,672.55).
Discussion
This final study, comparing mental characteristics of 
hypothetical aging scenarios across different groups, 
suggests that there are a multitude of factors that shape 
the mental construction of a hypothetical future event. 
Across the board, life-extension supporters reported more 
positive simulations characterized by a greater sense of 
self-continuity than any other group. Not only was the 
average rating of self-continuity for this group compa-
rable to control conditions (imagining the present) in pre-
vious studies, but life-extension supporters were the only 
group to report their mental simulations took a predom-
inately first-person perspective. Perhaps less surprisingly, 
the life-extension group also significantly differed in their 
ratings of the ethicality and likelihood of life-extension 
technologies. Exploratory analyses confirmed that across 
all three groups ethicality and likelihood were both signifi-
cantly correlated with self-continuity. What this suggests is 
that buy-in and support for “undoing aging” may enhance 
self-continuity when mentally transcending temporal dis-
tance. Of course, future empirical work will be necessary to 
test this conjecture.
General Discussion
Three experiments explored the characteristics associated 
with imagining life beyond the current life span under 
presuppositions of suspended biological aging. Whether 
asked to imagine being 120, 150, 180, 201, or 501 years 
old, the results demonstrated that participants were able 
to imagine hypothetical future scenarios as vividly as 
simulations of the present. Critically, however, imagining 
oneself beyond the current life expectancy was characterized 
by a reduction in self-continuity (compared to imagining 
the present). Outside of these components, the psycho-
logical laws of temporal distance seem to be suspended in 
the extremely distant future. When comparing the experi-
mental (hypothetical aging) conditions, temporal distance 
(e.g., the 30 years between 120 and 150 or the 300 years 
between 201 and 501) did not significantly alter character-
istics (e.g., vividness, valence, and self-continuity) of mental 
simulations. What this suggests is that biological aging it-
self may be a key mechanism driving the decrease in self-
continuity that is often associated with imagining oneself in 
the distant future. If this is the case, then differences in self-
continuity ratings between the control and experimental 
conditions may be better attributed to the hypotheticality 
component of psychological distance rather than the tem-
poral components. Future work will be necessary to unpack 
the relationship between different aspects of psychological 
distance on the effects of self-continuity (see Tausen et al., 
2019 for discussion).
Individual Differences
Demographic variables were probed here as they related 
to the components of mentally simulating life beyond the 
life span. Students, Mechanical Turk workers, and life-
extension supporters varied widely in the characteristics of 
their mental simulations. Most notably, the life-extension 
supporters showed a greater sense of self-continuity and 
positivity when imagining themselves in the extremely 
distant future. The relationship between support for life 
extension and valence was also evidenced in exploratory 
correlational analyses, such that the more feasible life ex-
tension was perceived to be, the more positive (Study 1) and 
ethical (Studies 1 and 2) it was rated. With the exception of 
the life-extension group, participants did not perceive aging 
interventions to be particularly likely. Group assessments 
of how ethical it would be to engage in these types of life-
extending interventions did lean toward moral acceptance. 
However, the student sample assessed here, which was also 
particularly high in religiosity, diverged significantly from 
the other two groups—rating life-extension techniques to 
be considerably less ethical (and less vivid). A  relation-
ship between religiosity and ethicality was also seen in 
Study 2, such that the more religious participants claimed 
to be, the less ethical they perceived regenerative aging 
techniques. These findings reinforce the work of Ballinger 
and colleagues (2017), who identified that religiosity was 
inversely correlated with the desirability of increasing 
one’s own life beyond the expected life span. More gen-
erally, Lang and Rupprecht (2019) have identified unique 
mindsets that shape individual cognitions around longevity 
across the life span. The current findings emphasize the 
importance of assessing individual differences associated 
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with beliefs about life-extension techniques and demon-
strate that the perceived likelihood and ethicality shape the 
mental landscape of life beyond the current life expectancy.
The age range of our samples also varied widely, 
allowing us to explore potential relationships between cur-
rent age and the characteristics of mentally simulating ex-
treme aging. Given the critical role of temporal distance on 
construal of the self and future events (Ersner-Hershfield, 
Garton, et al., 2009; Liberman & Trope, 1998), one might 
expect older adults, with correspondingly shorter temporal 
distances to the imagined time point, to exhibit a more con-
crete and connected future mental simulation. Effects of 
age as a covariate in our model do support this hypothesis. 
In Studies 1 and 2, age was identified as a significant pre-
dictor of the valence and self-continuity that characterized 
a mental simulation. Exploratory correlations revealed 
the nature of these effects, such that the older participants 
were, the more positively they rated their imagery and also 
the more connected they felt to their extremely distant fu-
ture selves. These findings were independent of condition, 
such that age did not differentially impact, for instance, 
simulations of 120  years old relative to simulations of 
150 years old. Rather, age was more generally associated 
with positivity and a sense of connection to one’s future self. 
These trends are consistent with previous work identifying 
that age was positively correlated with a “Utopian Vision” 
of life extension (Kogan et al., 2011), as well as the more 
general tendency for older adults to focus on positive (vs 
negative) information (Scheibe & Carsensen, 2010) and 
report higher levels of self-continuity than younger adults 
when imagining the future. Beyond valence, the current 
work is the first to suggest that age is positively correlated 
with the self-continuity that characterizes imagining one-
self living well beyond the current life expectancy.
A relationship between age and the reported vivid-
ness of a mental simulation was also seen in Study 2, 
such that the older participants were, the more vivid 
their mental simulations of the extremely distant future 
(e.g., 201/501). While previous work has found an op-
posite trend, a reduction in vividness and episodic spec-
ificity with increased age (Addis et al., 2008), we cannot 
rule out the possibility that suspended biological aging 
scenarios are constructed differently than simulating 
more realistic self-selected time points in one’s own fu-
ture. One potential explanation might lie in the type of de-
tail that populated extremely distant future simulations. 
The same body of work that demonstrated a reduction 
in episodic specificity for older adults also identified that 
older adults incorporate more external detail into their 
future simulations (Addis et al., 2008). To the extent that 
external detail maps onto reported vividness of hypo-
thetical aging scenarios, it is possible that with increased 
years comes a paradoxically richer representation of the 
extremely distant future. However, caution should be 
taken when inferring any relationship as the correlation 
between age and vividness was not evidenced in Study 
1. Future work will be necessary to examine the reliability 
of this finding.
Self-Continuity
With advancements in medicine and technology, there is 
a growing interest in the idea of life extension. The en-
thusiasm for halting biological aging is palpable among 
the community of life-extension supporters, yet the cur-
rent results provide a more generalizable assessment of 
the perceptions of these ideas across a wide variety of 
participants (see also Partridge, Lucke, Bartlett, & Hall, 
2009). While not necessarily morally opposed, people of 
variable demographics seem to be generally skeptical of the 
feasibility of such life-altering advancements (see also Pew 
Research Center 2013a,b & 2014). Of practical and theo-
retical consequence, our results demonstrate that imagining 
the extremely distant future, even when characterized by 
the suspension of biological aging, is associated with a 
sense of separation between one’s current and distant fu-
ture self. This effect was seen both in the perceived overlap 
between one’s real and imagined self as well as one’s 
present and future activities (i.e., the job one would be per-
forming) and remained significant after controlling for age. 
Corroborating and extending previous work looking at 
typical aging (Rutt & Löckenhoff, 2016b), chronological 
aging characterized by suspended biological aging is also 
associated with decreased self-continuity. Compounding 
environmental and ethical concerns about life extension 
(Schneider, 2009), increased years to live may come at 
the psychological cost of feeling disconnected from one’s 
future self.
It is well established that individuals often fail to delay 
gratification in the present to their own (future) detriment 
(Bartels & Rips, 2010; Ersner-Hershfield, Garton, et  al., 
2009; Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, et al., 2009). How much 
more, then, might this future self-neglect be problematic 
should one live well beyond 100  years of age? Without 
a heightened sense of self-continuity, it is likely that ex-
tended life spans would merely compound the problems 
of immediate gratification and future neglect currently ex-
perienced when it comes to both the self (physical and fi-
nancial) and the environment. Interestingly, some evidence 
suggests that older adults tend to be less prone to tem-
poral discounting, particularly when considering gains in 
the future (Löckenhoff, O’Donoghue, & Dunning, 2011). 
While these investigations have not been directly linked 
to self-continuity, the potential mediating role of a sense 
of connectedness to one’s future self is an important and 
underexplored topic that might help to explain some of 
the cognitive and behavioral differences between older and 
younger adults when thinking about the future (also see 
Löckenhoff et  al., 2011). Despite these well-established 
differences, explorations have been limited to relatively 
short time periods. Although age was positively correlated 
with self-continuity in the present research, extremely 
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distant future simulations were uniformly characterized 
by a reduction in self-continuity. What this suggests is that 
the heightened future self-continuity experienced by older 
adults is unlikely to translate into potential future benefits 
should the possibility to live well beyond the current life 
span become a reality.
Practical and Theoretical Considerations
Bearing in mind the trends for increased life expectancies 
across the globe, great consideration should be taken to 
further develop techniques, such as directed first-person 
simulations and immersive technologies (for individuals 
of all ages), that can be employed to increase the sense of 
self-continuity that accompanies imagining one’s distant 
future self (Hershfield et al., 2011; Macrae et al., 2017; 
Pronin et al., 2008; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Wakslak et al., 
2008). Enhancing self-continuity via these means may 
very well help individuals circumvent problems associ-
ated with failing to plan for the distant future. Another 
potential remedy (at least for those who are not ethically 
opposed) may lie simply in the increased understanding 
of, and advancements in, robust life-extension techniques. 
Consistent with the predictions from Construal 
Level Theory about the consequences of increased 
hypotheticality (Trope & Liberman, 2010), the current 
studies demonstrated that ratings of likelihood were 
highly correlated with a number of the basic character-
istics of mentally simulating an extremely distant future. 
Of particular consequence, the perceived likelihood of vi-
able life-extension techniques corresponded to how much 
overlap one experienced between their imagined and dis-
tant future selves. If extreme life extension is perceived as 
realistic, it may be possible to mentally traverse extraordi-
nary temporal distance while still feeling deeply connected 
to one’s distant future self. This was true for life-extension 
supporters whose average ratings of self-continuity when 
simulating oneself at 180  years old looked much like 
participants’ ratings in control conditions (imagining the 
present) in previous studies.
Moreover, hypothetical future aging scenarios that 
varied in temporal distance did not differ in self-continuity. 
Woven into the framework of Construal Level Theory 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010), it is possible that decreased 
self-continuity is a natural consequence of psychological 
distance, but that perceived hypotheticality, even more 
than temporal distance, is a key determinant (see Tausen 
et  al., 2019). Future work will be necessary to test these 
hypotheses and disentangle the roles of hypotheticality 
and temporal distance when investigating the sense of 
self-continuity that accompanies prospection. While there 
are undoubtedly countless approaches to such questions, 
leveraging scenarios denoted by chronological, without 
corresponding biological, aging may provide one avenue 
by which novel insights about psychological distance and 
Construal Level Theory could be obtained.
Beyond a sense of present and future self-overlap, a 
concern highlighted by a number of the participants 
sampled here (when asked how long they would like to 
live) is that of lacking social connection and purpose 
during the extended years in life. With the exception of the 
life-extension supporters, many participants’ responses 
about the desired length of life were dependent upon the 
survival of their loved ones or their ability to maintain or 
fulfill a particular life purpose. These findings corroborate 
apprehension expressed by Australians in a qualitative 
study investigating perceptions of life extension (Partridge 
et al., 2009) and young adults in Germany and the United 
States when considering more familiar forms of aging 
(Tahmaseb et al., 2003). Indeed, from a psychological per-
spective, the need to belong and to experience a sense of 
purpose and meaning in life would be critical concerns 
for the mental health and well-being of individuals with 
extremely extended life spans (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; 
Lansford, 2018; Maslow, 1968). There would, of course, 
be many benefits to an extended life span characterized 
by deep interpersonal connections without the decline of 
biological aging. If chronological aging, without nearing 
death, could be associated with meaningful work, as well 
as the established benefits of aging such as enhanced pos-
itive affect, emotional control, stability, and acceptance 
(Carstensen et  al., 2011; Shallcross et  al., 2013; Stone 
et  al., 2010; Urry & Gross, 2010), then the appeal of 
living longer, from a psychological perspective, is readily 
apparent.
Conclusion
The current work is the first systematic exploration of the 
mental characteristics associated with imagining life be-
yond the current life span. Three studies identified potential 
psychological hurdles of future life extension and charted 
the mental landscape of hypothetical aging scenarios. While 
future work may benefit from methodological approaches 
that extend beyond the single-item self-report measures 
utilized here, the current work provides a data-rich intro-
duction to how different groups of individuals imagine life 
beyond the current life expectancy. Critically, this research 
also provides fodder for intriguing theoretical questions 
about the impact of age and hypotheticality on a sense of 
self-continuity in temporally distant simulations. Future 
research will be necessary to probe these factors and de-
velop strategies to increase self-continuity in order to im-
prove personal and environmental decision-making should 
the opportunity arise to extend life beyond the (current) 
life span.
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